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INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION INITIATIVES VERSUS INDUSTRY INITIATIVES: A LOOK AT HOW COMMERCIALLY MOTIVATED TRANSACTIONS INCREASE AVIATION SAFETY
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Civil aviation safety is an indivisible and global regime such that any recognized aviation safety deficiency in one country threatens the safety of the entire global civil aviation system.
-Dr. John Saba, Air and Space Professor
I. INTRODUCTION
T HIRTY YEARS AGO, it was implausible to imagine that with the click of a button on your phone you would be able to schedule a private jet for a business flight the next day. Today, that implausibility has become reality in a world where air travel has steadily continued to increase and where aircraft manufacturers are struggling to keep up with the demand. Companies like JetSmarter 2 and BlackJet 3 allow customers to book a private flight or a seat on a private flight using an app on their cell phone. These two companies are only two examples of new aircraft finance and manufacturing paths the aviation industry is heavily pursuing to handle the increase in air travel customer demand.
Aircraft leasing has skyrocketed in the last decade and has significantly contributed to the expansion of the aviation industry.
The traditional way to obtain an aircraft is through cash-based transactions, but it is extremely expensive and requires a great deal of capital. Instead, operating leases permit airlines to obtain aircraft and expend less capital. 4 For example, operating leases allow airlines to lease aircraft for a specific amount of time to accurately meet the demand for air travel. The airlines then do not have to use their precious capital and get to maintain their liquid assets. 5 In 1980, only 1.7% of Boeing's aircraft were leased; but by 2012, Boeing had leased 37.7% of its aircraft. 6 The number of leased Boeing aircraft is predicted to increase to greater than 50% by 2020. 7 According to the KGAL Group, a German based asset manager, " [t] he trend toward aircraft leasing has gained momentum as a result of the deregulation and liberali[z]ation of aviation." 8 This aircraft leasing trend does not look like it will slow down any time soon, and the aviation industry has to quickly address how to handle issues that arise because of it.
The issue that this article will address is whether the aircraft leasing phenomena is promoting aviation safety better than International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) initiatives. It will be argued that industry initiatives are more effective than ICAO initiatives because the industry is focused on filling safety gaps using commercial transactions, which makes it easier for the industry to garner support. The article will first present the background information on two ICAO initiated treaties and one industry initiated treaty. Next, it will compare the two different treaty systems. Third, it will address the reasons why industry initiated international treaties are better at gathering support and adequately addressing issues than ICAO initiated international treaties. Finally, it will explain where ICAO's focus should be and how ICAO and the industry can work together to better aviation as a whole and promote a safe aviation environment. 
II. BACKGROUND
International treaties have been necessary guides throughout the aviation industry's history. Many countries and organizations have worked together to address different issues where international correlation and cooperation is required.
A. ICAO ICAO has been one of the leading organizations in advancing international aviation and was created by the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention). 9 According to ICAO's overall objectives, found in Article 44 of the Chicago Convention, it was established "to develop the principles and techniques of international air navigation and to foster the planning and development of international air transport."
10 Since its creation in 1944, it has become clear that ICAO's number one priority is safety.
11 Three of the main objectives set forth in Article 44 are focused on safety, to "[i]nsure the safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation throughout the world; . . .
[m]eet the needs of the peoples of the world for safe, regular, efficient [,] and economical air transport; . . . [and] [p]romote safety of flight in international air navigation." 12 ICAO created its Legal Committee in 1947 for the purpose of drafting international aviation treaties. 13 Each of the 191 Member States gets one vote in the committee, and a majority must agree for a decision to be made on draft text of international treaties.
14 Although this democratic procedure allows for participation from many actors, it can have its downfalls. For example, while a draft of a treaty may end up getting passed, Member States that voted for the draft may not agree with the final product and then decline to sign it. Because they are focused on specific events that prompt them to initiate international treaties, members of ICAO may not see the safety gaps that actually exist within the industry. Industry professionals are better situated to recognize safety gaps within the aviation industry due to these problems possibly affecting their everyday work. Although ICAO, as an organization, is usually only seen as the depository for international conventions and that the conventions are acts of the Member States themselves at a Diplomatic Conference, 15 ICAO has been known to take a very active role in the preparation of international conventions and protocols. 16 ICAO has acted as the main initiator of many of the international aviation treaties. In 2009, ICAO initiated the implementation of two international conventions on issues that it found pertinent. . 18 Many scholars claim that the Unlawful Interference Compensation Convention was mainly in response to the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States because the attacks significantly pushed ICAO to speed up its work on third party liability issues. 19 Although this event was extremely tragic, the aviation industry was not necessarily in need of the Unlawful Interference Compensation Convention.
are relatively uncommon over the long haul." 21 There are three main parts to this Convention.
First, when the damage is caused by an aircraft in flight, the operator will be liable to pay for the damages that are within the extent of this convention. 22 Even if the air carrier is not liable for the damages and is actually a victim as well, the Convention's risk allocation principle still requires the air carrier to pay for damages up to a certain amount. 23 The amount the carrier is required to pay depends on the aircraft's weight at takeoff and is capped at 1.05 billion dollars. 24 Article 24 25 of the Convention gives the aircraft operator the right of recourse against the person or organizations that actually caused the event, such as alQaeda and the actual terrorists who took part in the September 11th attacks. 26 Although the right to recourse allows for the operators to possibly recoup their money from the actors at fault, it is unlikely that the persons responsible for the attack have the financial means to cover these damages and that the operators or their home State would be able to actually enforce a recourse judgment. 27 It is implausible to believe that the United States would get paid by al-Qaeda or from the deceased terrorists' estates.
Second, damages that exceed the 1.05 billion dollar cap would be paid for by the International Civil Aviation Compensation Fund up to 4.5 billion dollars. 28 This fund is made up of a "mandatory amounts collected in respect of each passenger and each tonne of cargo departing on an international commercial flight from an airport in a State Party." 29 The duty to collect these amounts and put them into the Fund lies with the operator and it is unlikely the operator would want to take on this 21 additional task. 30 Some scholars argue that the Fund, along with other parts of the Unlawful Interference Compensation Convention, would not work sufficiently if an event similar to the September 11th terrorist attacks were to occur in the future. 31 Third, the operator will have unlimited liability for any damages that exceed the first two limits if it is proven that "the operator or its employees have contributed to the occurrence of the event by an act or omission done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result."
32 If the operator can prove that it had an oversight program in place that would point out specific employees who may participate in these types of situations, then technically the Unlawful Interference Compensation Convention allows them to possibly avoid this liability, but it is hard to see how this exception would play out in an actual case. 33 Many aviation scholars believe that States have an obligation to help airlines cover these types of damages, but others claim that State obligation would cause even less signatories to the Unlawful Interference Compensation Convention.
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Even though the Unlawful Interference Compensation Convention has ICAO's support, it struggles to gain support from the aviation industry. This lack of support and signatories is the reason that the Unlawful Interference Compensation Convention is not yet in force. 35 As of April 2016, it had only eleven signatures, two ratifications, and four accessions. 36 It is impor- 42 The General Risks Convention allows for equitable compensation to third-party victims for damages not caused by unlawful interference, which it notes will help keep stability within the international aviation industry. 43 It bases the determination of strict liability damages of third-parties on the weight of the aircraft. 44 It mixes the liability system for passenger and 37 See Appendix A infra. 38 cargo liability with the liability system for surface damages, which seems to be disliked by many States.
45
Although the General Risks Convention has a bit more support than the Unlawful Interference Compensation Convention, 46 it also is not in force due to the lack of support and signatories. 47 As of April 2016, it had only thirteen signatures, two ratifications, and five accessions. 48 Much of its support came from the same States that supported the Unlawful Interference Compensation Convention. 49 The difference in support between the two was that Chile and Nigeria signed only the General Risks Convention and the Democratic Republic of Congo and Gabon only acceded to the General Risks Convention. 55 The Aircraft Protocol specifically applies principles within the Cape Town Convention to the needs of the aviation finance area, such as specific deregistration and exportation of aircraft. 56 The purpose of the Cape Town Convention was to facilitate international aviation finance transactions and to help interest holders employ remedies in the case of default by the debtor in these transactions. 57 The Cape Town Convention provides three key benefits. 58 First, it established a right of repossession in an instance where the debtor of aircraft or aircraft engine defaults. 59 Second, it created the International Registry to allow for creditor priority when they register their "International Interest." 60 tablished the rights of other interested parties who have registered their specific interests in aircraft or aircraft parts.
61
The Cape Town Convention has been extremely successful at gaining support from States around the world. According to Sir Roy Goode, "[t]he perceived importance of these two instruments is attested by the fact that no fewer than 20 participating States signed them during the closing ceremony." 62 As of April 2016, the Cape Town Convention had 64 parties and 28 signatures. 63 The substantial amount of support for the Cape Town Convention made apparent the aviation industry's need for an international treaty focused on commercial transactions and default remedies that also helped fill safety gaps.
III. COMPARISON OF THE TWO DIFFERENT TREATY SYSTEMS
Aviation scholar, G. Nathan Calkins Jr., made the following statement when discussing the 1933 Rome Convention, which also applies to the Unlawful Interference Compensation Convention and the General Risks Convention: "The relatively small number of countries to ratify indicates either that there is little need for such a convention or that the convention is not properly responsive to that need." 64 Due to the lack of industry support it seems as though the first option by Calkins is correct in that these two conventions were not necessary. Although ICAO's intentions were good, it was focused on creating policies that addressed safety needs it believed were necessary due to past events, when really these Conventions did not address the critical safety needs facing the aviation industry at the current time and in the future. 65 The Chicago Convention's designation of 61 safety issue oversight to ICAO was heavily supported because of the industry need for uniform safety standards, but the industry did not see as much of a need or benefit from the implementation of the Unlawful Interference Compensation Convention and General Risk Convention. 66 The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 67 (UNIDROIT) recognized the industry need for uniform global standards on aircraft financing measures back in the 1980s; however, its slow progress resulted in the failure to address this need for nearly sixteen years. 68 In 1994, UNIDROIT created the Aviation Working Group to try and ramp up its progress, but real movement toward a solution was not made until 1996 when The Boeing Company 69 (Boeing) requested ICAO and the International Air Transport Association 70 (IATA) aid UNIDROIT in its efforts. Boeing was focused on at the very least the development of uniform global standards on aircraft equipment. 71 This initiative, taken by a private company working within the aviation industry, helped spark the establishment of the overall Cape Town Convention and its Aircraft Protocol. 72 The Cape Town Convention allows for States to make declarations of whether to adopt certain rules, which is much more flexible than most international treaties. 73 The drafters of the Cape Town Convention purposefully established this flexibility and customization tool to better fit with each State's national laws, so that the likelihood of support from many States would increase. 74 The Cape Town Convention is a great model for future international commercial aviation treaties.
IV. INDUSTRY INITIATIVE BETTER PROMOTES SAFETY AND ECONOMICS
As stated by the former Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs at the U.S. Department of Transportation, Karan Bhatia, "the [Cape Town] treaty is a very practical and useful way of promoting aviation safety in partnerships with countries across the globe." 76 The aviation industry initiative taken with the Cape Town Convention allowed for many safety concerns to be further addressed and improved economics on both a public sector and private sector level. The Cape Town Convention has been more effective at promoting safety than either the Unlawful Interference Compensation Convention or the General Risks Convention.
The Cape Town Convention specifically helped operators in developing countries finance aircraft using a discounted interest rate, as long as these States agreed to adopt specific "creditorfriendly provisions." 77 These finance measures allow developing States and their air carriers to obtain better aircraft, especially when their current aircrafts are outdated and are more prone to have safety issues. 78 The use of updated aircraft by developing countries utilizing these finance structures will enhance safety internationally.
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By using less complicated finance models and operating leases, not only could smaller operators with less capital obtain aircraft in better condition, they also could pass adequately maintained older aircraft on to other air carriers. 80 In the past, airlines in developing countries have been known to buy older aircraft from more developed countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, yet these developing countries do not possess the necessary maintenance expertise to maintain these aircrafts. 81 Even though the accident rate increases when operating older aircraft, with proper maintenance it is possible to safely operate these aircraft. 82 Many aircraft operators in these developing States lack financial resources to keep older aircraft in adequate shape to be safely used. 83 Failure of equipment is cited as one of the main causes of aircraft crashes in developing States. 84 According to Air and Space Professor, John Saba, "[seventy percent] of aviation accidents occur in the developing . . . countries when they account for only [fifteen percent] of the aviation traffic." 85 In Western European countries, there is approximately one fatal aircraft incident per one million departures. 86 Comparatively, in African nations there are approximately thirteen fatal aircraft incidents per one million departures. 87 The increase in aircraft accidents in developing countries is due in part to limited resources, the lack of properly trained technicians, and the inability to afford or obtain necessary maintenance parts. 88 Although there has been a push for uniform international safety policies regarding aircraft, most of the new policies focus on authorizing new aircraft design not aircraft maintenance. 89 The Cape Town Convention provides for commercial transactions that address proper aircraft maintenance by the lessor, rather than a lessee in a developing State. Better aircraft maintenance results in safer aircraft being flown all over the world, not just in developed States. Aircraft leasing allows lessors, such as Boeing and Airbus, 90 to require that lessees return the aircraft for maintenance procedures. 91 The aircraft lessor has an interest in the aircraft being maintained properly so that once the lease ends the lessor can possibly lease the aircraft again. 92 This works in conjunction with the international policy that "[a]ircraft maintenance must always be performed in a coordinated manner that is largely determined by the manufacturer and the State of Design and Certification." 93 An added interest of the lessee, besides having safe aircraft to operate is that proper maintenance by the lessor makes it less likely the aircraft will be "blacklisted"
94 by developed nations due to being unsafe to fly. 95 By moving aircraft maintenance from a lessee in a developing country to a lessor in a developed country, it ensures that proper maintenance is done, in turn verifying that the aircraft is safe for operation.
The State where an aircraft is registered is responsible for overseeing the aircraft is safe to fly, even if the aircraft is operating in another State. 96 The State of Registration should require that aircraft operating in other States be sent back to it so that the aircraft can be "serviced and maintained under local supervision and by locally licensed technicians."
97 Some States will allow for aircraft to be serviced at repair stations in other States if the stations have previously been approved by the State of Registration.
V. ICAO'S NEW FOCUS
As illustrated in the previous section, international treaties regarding commercial transactions are better at promoting safety than treaties that are not commercially motivated. ICAO's focus should be on helping make these commercial transactions easier for the aviation industry, rather than on initiating new, noncommercially motivated treaties. ICAO should use its resources to create new programs that further advance industry initiatives, like the Cape Town Convention. If ICAO focuses on measures that make the leasing of aircraft easier, it will in turn make the aviation industry safer.
One IATA has developed best practices for aircraft leases and through work done under NCLB, ICAO is helping to make commercial transactions easier. 106 The lack of financial resources in developing States results in substandard aircraft maintenance procedures, but if ICAO focuses on making it simpler to lease aircraft, these leases help solve this maintenance issue.
107
Through NCLB work, ICAO assists States that have not had the resources to implement SARPs, resulting in safer aviation practices both within those States and internationally. 108 
VI. CONCLUSION
The ratification of the Cape Town Convention helped establish that industry initiative is better at promoting aviation safety than ICAO. The Cape Town Convention uses socio-economic measures of aircraft leasing to fill safety gaps, especially in developing nations. Also, aircraft leasing measures under the Cape Town Convention help aircraft manufacturers keep up with the demand for aircraft. Because the Convention provides actual ways to address commercial needs within the aviation industry while promoting safer air travel, it was able to collect support from all types of players in the international aviation community. The lack of support for the Unlawful Interference Compensation Convention and General Risks Convention illustrates ICAO's misplaced focus on developing international treaties that are not commercially motivated and are insufficient at filling safety gaps within the aviation industry. ICAO should focus on developing programs that advance industry initiatives, therefore helping to decrease the amount of aviation safety gaps. Overall, ICAO and the industry should work together on commercially motivated international agreements and standards to promote a safer aviation environment. 104 BARTSCH, supra note 58, at 58-59. 105 Id. . 107 Saba, supra note 1, at 50. 108 No Country Left Behind, supra note 99; see BARTSCH, supra note 58, at 59.
